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Comment.
Dependent-Neglect Proceedings: A Case.
for Procedural Due Process*
It is a serious matter for the long arm of the State to reach into a
home and snatch a child from its mother. It is a power which a
a government dedicated to freedom for the individual should exer-
cise with extreme care, and only where the evidence clearly estab-
lishes necessity.'
INTRODUCrION
Fourteenth Amendment2 rights of due process and equal protection
have continually demanded the attention of the United States Supreme
Court in recent years, notably in the area of criminal procedure.8 Since
the Gault 4 decision of 1967, children have been recognized holders of
the right to procedural due process in juvenile court delinquency pro-
ceedings. Gault provided for right to counsel, right to notice of specific
charges or factual allegations, confrontation and cross-examination of
witnesses, and the privilege against self-incrimination. 5 In re Winship6
further extended the child's right to procedural due process by re-
quiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt as the standard to be met for
a finding of delinquency. Mr. Justice Fortas, writing for the Court in
Gault, stated that "[u]nder our Constitution, the condition of being a
This discussion of dependent-neglect proceedings is based on the author's personal
experience and observations of the Allegheny County. Juvenile Court and Child Welfare
Services Bureau while employed by the Neighborhood Legal Services Association. Practical
experience was gained by working with attorneys and clients involved in dependent-neglect
cases. In addition, the, author interviewed personnel of Juvenile Court, Child Welfare
Services, and other social agencies in Allegheny County during the period from April to
December of 1970. Special thanks is due to both the Allegheny County Child Welfare
Services Bureau and Juvenile Court for their interest and co-operation.
1. 180 Pa. Super. 143, 148, 117 A.2d 780, 783 (1956).
2. U.S. CONST. amend;.-XIV, § 1;.
3. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US. 436 (1966); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145,(1968);
Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
4. In re Gault, 387 U.. 1 (1967).
5. Id.
6. In re Winship, 397 US. 358 (1970). Winship questioned the constitutionality of the
:standard of proof in .the New Yqrk-Family Court.Act providing for a preponderance of
the evidence as sufficient for a finding of delinquency.
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boy does not justify a kangaroo court."7 The Court reasoned that in a
delinquency proceeding a child is liable to incarceration in an indus-
trial or reform school-a confinement amounting to a deprivation of
liberty requiring the protection of Fourteenth Amendment due pro-
cess.8 Both the Gault and Winship decisions were strictly limited to the
adjudicatory stage of delinquency proceedings.9
Serious questions concerning the individual's constitutional rights,
viz., procedural due process, are equally involved in dependent-neglect
cases, yet these questions have been wholly ignored in the attention
given delinquency hearings.
Dependent-neglect cases arise when instances of emotionally or phys-
ically deprived children come to the attention of a juvenile court. The
purpose of a dependent-neglect hearing is to determine whether the
state should assume guardianship of the child, with the possibility of re-
moval from the parent's custody.10 Such adjudications involve rights of
the child and parent, and question the very existence of the family as an
institution. The functioning of the family, the basic unit of our society,
is under direct scrutiny when a court seeks to determine if a child is
being neglected. For this reason, when the State uses its judicial ma-
chinery to disrupt the family relationship by separating a child from
his parents, all the safeguards of procedural due process should be ob-
served.
The purpose of this comment is to set forth arguments for applying
standards of due process to dependent-neglect proceedings. The notice-
able dearth of case law and scholarly opinion in this area11 presents
virgin soil in which the advocate may attempt to produce an awareness
of the system's defects, as it now operates, and develop methods for
curing those ills.
THE CHILD WELFARE SERVICES
The concern our society feels for the physical, emotional and psycho-
logical well-being of children is evidenced by the growth of private
and governmental agencies, and state and federal legislation dedicated
7. In re Gault, supra note 4, at 28.
8. Id. at 27.
9. Id. at 13; Winship, 397 U.S. at 359.
10. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 244 (1933).
11. The author was unable to discover any case law, articles in law reviews or other
professional periodicals dealing specifically with the application of procedural due process
to dependent-neglect hearings.
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to helping and protecting children. Social services geared to the needs
of children are provided by child welfare agencies, public and private,
throughout the United States. The children who most often come to
the attention of child welfare agencies are:
Those who have troubles or conflicts in their families or who
are in need of guardians or permanent homes through adoption.
Those who are living in one-parent families as the result of
death, desertion, divorce, or birth out of wedlock.
Those who are neglected, abused, or exploited by their parents.
Those who are ill, physically or mentally handicapped, or suffer-
ing from emotional difficulties.
Those who have behavior problems or who are delinquent.
Those who have problems arising out of special home condi-
tions, such as employment of the mother or her absence from the
home due to illness or for other reasons.
Those who are handicapped by conditions in the community or
by the circumstances under which they live, such as poverty or
unemployment, housing too inadequate for decency, or those of
migrants and other minority groups. 12
The problems of these children are closely allied to their family situa-
tion. Helping the family as well as the child is, therefore, the purpose
of child welfare services.'3
The Allegheny County Commissioners established the County Child
Welfare Services Bureau in the summer of 1963; operations began in
the early part of 1964.14 Foster Home-Finding, Adoption, Shelter Care,
and Protective Services are the departments of the agency administering
to the needs of dependent and neglected children of Allegheny County.
Two-thirds of the children involved with the agency remain in their
own homes. The other one-third must receive outside care either be-
cause they have no families, their parents are unable to care for them
and voluntarily relinquish custody, or their parents do not properly
provide for them and they are removed from the home by court order.
12. CHILDREN'S BUREAU, WELFARE ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDU-
CATION AND WELFARE, Publication No. 406,. CHILD WELFARE SERVICES, at 5, 1963 (reprint
1966); interview with Thomas Carros, Director of Allegheny County Child Welfare Services,
in Pittsburgh, July, 1970.
13. CHILDREN'S BUREAU, supra note 12, at 8.
14. The following discussion of the Allegheny Child Welfare Services Bureau is derived
from interviews with members of the executive and supervisory staff of the agency:
Thomas Carros, Director; supervisors Ned Hollis, Dorothy Reinhard, Rosemary Phaneuf,
Paul Aigner, and Barbara Pacifico. Additional sources of information were: Act of June
13, 1967, P.L. -, §§ 701-731, PURDON'S PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62, §§ 701-731 (1968); PENN-
SYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WELFARE, OFFICE OF FAMILY SERVICES, REGULATION
MAUAL: CmUIDREN AND YOUTH MANUAL.
653
Duquesne Law Review Vol. 9: 651, 1971
When the caseworker providing protective services15 to the child and
family believes that the parents either cannot or will not remedy the
circumstances leading to neglect, he will petition juvenile court to give
Child Welfare Services custody of the child. Unless it is a case of severe
abuse or abandonment, juvenile court does not become involved until
Child Welfare has worked with the family many months or even years.16
PENNSYLVANIA JUVENILE COURTS
The Pennsylvania juvenile Court Law governs both delinquency
and dependent-neglect proceedings.17 The courts' jurisdiction in mat-
ters regarding delinquent, dependent and neglected children is exclu-
sive.1 8 Prior to 1963 the juvenile courts were responsible for the
pre-hearing stages of dependent-neglect cases now handled by Child
Welfare Services under the State Department of Welfare.19 Since Child
Welfare Services has been in operation, juvenile courts become in-
volved only when a court order is needed to provide for the care and
placement of a dependent and/or neglected child.
The juvenile courts were created for the specific purpose of dealing
with delinquent, dependent and neglected children apart from the
adult judicial system. The court seeks to rehabilitate the child and save
him from the adverse sociological and psychological circumstances
which led to his dependent, neglected, or delinquent condition. 20 They
are purely statutory courts without foundation in common law, and
are, therefore, strictly limited within the confines of the creating stat-
15. Protective Services involves the assigning of a caseworker, a trained social worker
employed by the agency, to the child. The caseworker makes visits to the home and dis-
cusses the child and family situation with the parents to determine if help is needed.
If professional help is required, then the caseworker works with the child and his family
to solve their problems.
16.. Some examples of the types of problems involved are: a mentally or physically
handicapped child not receiving necessary medical care or educational training; the
emotionally disturbed child in need of professional treatment; the child without proper
nourishment or clothing; the child repeatedly left in the home without adult supervision;
the physically or mentally abused child; and an emotionally disturbed or physically handi-
capped parent who cannot provide for the child's needs.
17. See note 10, § 244.
18. Id.
19. See note 14.
20. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); In re Samuel W. v. Family Court of New York, 24
N.Y.2d 196, 299 N.Y.S.2d 417, 247 N.E.2d 171 (1969); People v. Lewis, 260 N.Y. 171 (1932);
Holme's Appeal, 379 Pa. 599, 109 A.2d 523 (1954); Commonwealth v. Fisher, 213 Pa. 48,
62 A.2d 198 (1905). The courts' opinions in these cases present a thorough discussion of
the purposes of the juvenile court system. They concentrate on the sociological and psy-
chological theories responsible for the development.of juvenile courts.
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ute. 2 1 Rules of procedure and rules and regulations for the conduct of
officers and employees are to be formulated by the individual juvenile
courts 22 instead of applying the rules of procedure and evidence appli-
cable to other county courts. To date, the juvenile courts have not
produced written rules of procedure. 23
An informal atmosphere is maintained for juvenile court proceed-
ings to further their purpose as rehabilitative rather than punitive.24
The procedure is more akin to that of an administrative agency or ar-
bitration board than to an adversary proceeding. The desire is to pro-
mote communication between the child, family and court.
Hearings are initiated upon petition of "any citizen, resident of the
county," setting forth that a child is neglected, dependent or delin-
quent2 5-- the only definitions of which are provided in the statute.26
There is no system of pleading beyond the filing of the petition-a
printed form with space available for a general statement of the reasons
for requesting a hearing. In a majority of cases dependent-neglect
petitions are filed by a Child Welfare Services caseworker to request
removal of the child from his parents' custody.
Courtroom procedure is controlled by the presiding judge. Aside
from general provisions in the statute for the filing of petitions,2 sepa-
2L Juvenile jurisdiction in Allegheny County is now posited in the Court of Common
Pleas. Act of Dec. 2, 1968, P.L. -, § 2, PUROON'S PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 235.2 (Supp. 1970).
22. See note 10, § 265.
23. In an article in the Pittsburgh Press, Dec. 20, 1970, § 1, at 16, col. 1, the judges of
the Allegheny County Juvenile Court indicated that the State's nine-judge Juvenile Court
Commission has been assigned the drafting of proposed rules of court.
24. See note 20.
25. See note 10, § 246.
26. Id. § 243:
(5) The words "neglected child" shall mean a child
(a) who is abandoned by his parent .... or
(b) who lacks proper parental care by reason of the fault or habits of his parent,
... ,or
(c) whose parent, . . . neglects or refuses to provide proper or necessary sub-
stance, education, medical or surgical care or other care necessary to the
child's health, morals or well-being, or
(d) whose parent . . . neglects or refuses to provide special care made necessary
by the cnild's mental condition, or
(e) who is found in a disreputable place or associates with vagrant, vicious or
immoral persons, or
(f) who engages in an occupation, or in a situation dangerous to life or limb,
or injurious to the health, morals or general welfare of himself or others.
(6) The words "dependent child" shall mean a child
(a) who is homeless or destitute or dependent on the public for support, or
.(b) who is without a parent or guardian able to provide for his support, train-
ing and education, or
(c) who is otherwise in need of personal guardianship.
27. Id. § 246.
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ration of juvenile from adult proceedings, 28 available alternatives for
disposition, 29 and a prohibition against jury trials,30 the statute gives no
direction to the court's procedure. While the right to notice of charges
and counsel are afforded the parents, the right to confrontation and
cross-examination of witnesses, the right to counsel for the child, and
the privilege against self-incrimination required by Gault in delin-
quency proceedings have not, as yet, been extended to dependent-
neglect hearings.
At the beginning of a dependent-neglect case, the caseworker-peti-
tioner relates to the judge, in narrative form, her reasons for requesting
custody of the child.31 The judge questions the petitioner, and then
permits the parents' attorney to ask questions. Petitioner's testimony
consists of the caseworker's professional opinions of the child's and
family's situation, based on her case work with them and on school,
medical, and psychological reports. The petitioner-caseworker also
discusses her attempts to solve the problems causing the dependency
and/or neglect. If there are witnesses for petitioner's case, they testify
at this time and are questioned by the judge and the parents' attorney.
The parents are often excluded during this portion of the hearing.
Judges and caseworkers argue for the exclusion of parents during
petitioner's case as necessary to maintain the caseworker-parent rela-
tionship and to prevent damaging the child-parent relationship. The
reasoning is that these relationships are of such a delicate nature that
exposing them to a clinical discussion of the psychological and social
problems involved, and an analysis of the intimate details of the func-
tioning of parents and child as a family, will impair the trust and con-
fidence necessary to the maintenance of these relationships. After
presentation of petitioner's case, the parents are brought in and ques-
tioned by their attorney and the judge. The parents may also produce
their own witnesses, who will be similarly questioned.
DEFECTS OF THE SYSTEM
The object of this comment is not to demand an adversary proceed-
ing with all the trappings of a trial in the "adult" courts. The inform-
28. Id. § 249.
29. Id. §§ 249, 250, 253.
30. Id. § 247.
31. The following discussion of procedure as it operates in a dependent-neglect hear-
ing is based on interviews of caseworkers and attorneys and observation of Allegheny
County Juvenile Court proceedings.
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ality of the juvenile courts serves an important function in furthering the
work of such agencies as the County Child Welfare Services Bureau. Yet,
it is submitted that the very delicacy of the family relationship which
necessitates protection from the harshness of the traditional courtroom
procedure, also necessitates the observance of basic procedural due
process before the state may infringe upon essential familial rights.
The absence of recognized rules of evidence and written rules of
procedure greatly hamper the effectiveness of an attorney representing
parents in a dependent-neglect case. An attorney appearing before
juvenile court for the first time finds it difficult to function in the in-
formal atmosphere. Hearsay, ex parte reports and narrative testimony
based on opinion are generally admissible. When the attorney objects,
he discovers that the judge will admit the testimony and sift out that
which is irrelevant and hearsay for himself. Even the attorney ex-
perienced in juvenile court work is often relegated to the role of a
passive participant without the tools of procedure and evidence to
protect his client's case. The use of precise pleadings, depositions and
interrogatories available to the attorney in other courts are not found
in juvenile court. Unlike a complaint or bill of indictment setting
forth charges against a defendant in a civil or criminal trial, the petition
in a dependent-neglect case32 gives only a general statement of the
charges against his client. What issues will be determinative at the
hearing are, therefore, not clarified until the petitioner's case is pre-
sented to the court. 8
Closely allied with the lack of evidentiary rules and procedure are
the vague standards to be met in proving neglect. The definitions set
forth in the statute34 constitute the sole source providing elements
of neglect. The petitioner-caseworker, presenting his case in narrative
form,3 5 does not attempt to prove specific elements of neglect, but
draws a general picture of the family situation in which the child is
neglected. Although the caseworker will give specific instances of ne-
glect, his testimony is not organized to prove specific elements, as in a
case for battery where the plaintiff must prove the specific elements of
the tort. To demand standards of proof in a dependent-neglect case
as those in tort law, would be unrealistic. But without something more
definite than now exists, the parents and their attorney are seriously
32. See p. 655 supra.
33. See p. 656 supra.
34. See note 26.
35. See p. 656 supra.
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hindered in preparing for and meeting the case presented against them.
The practice of excluding parents during crucial testimony is a
serious infringement of their right to confrontation and cross-examina-
tion of witnesses.86 A caseworker does not request custody of a child
unless he is unable to solve the problems of the family by working with
the parents to improve the circumstances which necessitated the in-
volvement of Child Welfare. Therefore, if the situation has reached
such an impasse as to require a petition for removal, it is doubtful that
the caseworker-parent or child-parent relationships can be on very
solid ground to begin with. It is submitted that if these delicate rela-
tionships are unstable enough to require a court hearing, their protec-
tion does not justify the denial of Fourteenth Amendment rights to
confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses. If the parents are
not present to hear the caseworker-petitioner's case against them,' it
increases the burden of the attorney trying to represent the parents.
An effective defense is dependent upon knowing the charges that
defendant faces. As previously indicated, the issues to be proven are
not clearly defined before the petitioner's case is presented in court.
Without having heard the case against them neither attorney nor client
can prepare an adequate argument.
The parents in a dependent-neglect hearing are given the right to
counsel, yet neither the child nor the caseworker-petitioner have legal
representation. Although in theory the informal proceeding is to
prevent a controversy with advocate posed against advocate, in reality
the parties are representing opposing sides. The petitioner argues that
the child is neglected and must be removed from the home; the parents
argue that the child should remain in their custody. The child is placed
in the middle. It is the judge, not the caseworker-petitioner or the
parents, who calls the child as a witness. It is the judge who questions
the child first, permitting the other parties to ask questions if they
choose. The child is not a witness for either side, and should, therefore,
have independent counsel. The caseworker-petitioner should also have
legal representation. A social worker with no legal training cannot be
expected to present legally cogent arguments. The caseworker-peti-
tioner is not always able to separate legally relevant from irrelevant
testimony, and often becomes emotional when the parents' attorney
attempts cross-examination of him. In these circumstances it can be
difficult for the petitioner to present his case effectively. Because
36. See p. 656 supra.
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petitioner's case may be improperly organized and ithe testimony not
entered by the best evidentiary methods, the case may appear much
weaker than it is. Counsel for petitioner, child, and parent are necessary
to assure fair and competent representation for all parties to the hearing.
The inconsistency found between Pennsylvania statutory and case
law regarding burden of proof presents another serious defect in de-
pendent-neglect procedure. The problem is whether some objective
finding of neglect is required or whether "the best interests of the
child" is to govern the outcome of the hearing. Section 243 of the stat-
ute sets forth general criteria to determine if a child is neglected or de-
pendent.37 The only available Pennsylvania case law as to how these
definitions are to relate to standards of proof is represented by In re
Rinker and In re Rose.38
In Rinker, the Superior Court stated, "[a] child cannot be declared
'neglected' merely because his condition might be improved by chang-
ing his parents."39 The court further indicated that its purpose was not
to determine what is for the best interest of the child, but to adjudicate
whether or not a child is neglected.
In the Rose case the Superior Court stated:
The power of the Juvenile Court is not to adjudicate what is for
the best interest of a child, but to adjudicate whether or not a
child is neglected and dependent, and if so, to make orders in relief
of the child.40
These opinions apparently indicate that there is a standard to be
met-some criteria for determining what is neglect. As previously
mentioned, the only available source for such a standard is section 243
of the statute. The inconsistency comes from section 250 of the same
statute by which the judge, after an inquiry of the facts, is to "determine
whether the best interests of a child and the State require the care,
guidance and control of such child." [Emphasis added.]
Whether proof of the specifics set forth in the statute's definitions is
required, or whether it is entirely within the discretion of the judge to
determine what is for the child's "best interest" is a problem which
reduces the competency of both the petitioner's and the attorney's
presentation at the hearing. Without a clear understanding of the
37. See note 26.
38. In re Rinker, 180 Pa. Super. 143, 117 A.2d 780 (1955); In re Rose, 161 Pa. Super.
204, 54 A.2d 297 (1947).
39. Rinker, at 148, 117 A.2d at 784.
40. Rose, at 208, 54 A.2d at 298.
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standard of proof required, neither can know what is necessary as to
relevant testimony and cross-examination.
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
One of the greatest obstacles to recognizing the constitutional defects
in deliquency proceedings was defining their nature. From the passage
of the first juvenile court statutes to the opinion in Gault, juvenile
court proceedings were classified as "civil" and justified by the theory
that the state stepped in as parens patriae, thereby taking over the rights
and duties of the parent to control the child.41 Gault determined that
any threat to a child's liberty required the safeguards of procedural
due process.42 The proceedings were thereafter classified as quasi-crimi-
nal because, as in a criminal trial, it is an individual's liberty which is
at stake.
To determine what procedural safeguards are necessary and applica-
ble, dependent-neglect proceedings must also be classified. As with
delinquency hearings prior to Gault, the sociological theories responsi-
ble for our system of juvenile courts have maintained that dependent-
neglect proceedings cannot be classified within traditional judicial
formulas. The arguments put forth for keeping the hearings informal
are also applied to keeping the hearings unclassified. 43 As Justice Mus-
manno indicated in his dissenting opinion in Holme's Appeal, reality
has never measured up to theory."
It may be argued that dependent-neglect proceedings are civil in the
nature of custody cases. In both custody and dependent-neglect cases it
is the custody of the child which is ultimately at stake. The protections
of procedural due process are present in a custody case, which is argued
by legal counsel in an adversary proceeding with all the trappings of
a formal trial.45 There is even greater necessity to observe standards of
due process in dependent-neglect cases in view of the significant differ-
ence between dependent-neglect and custody cases. The controversy in
a custody case is between parties with an established right to guardian-
ship of the child-parents, relatives, or an agency which has previously
41. See note 20.
42. 387 U.S. at 27.
43. See p. 655 supra.
44. Holme's Appeal, 370 Pa. 599, 615, 109 A.2d 523, 529 (1954); cited by Justice Fortas
in his opinion for the Court in Gault at 27.
45. Act of Aug. 10, 1951, P.L. 1163, § 301; Aug. 4, 1955, P.L. 302, § 1; Feb. 10, 1956,
P.L. 1022, § 3; July 11, 1957, P.L. 791, § 1; Oct. 13, 1959, P.L. 1311, § 1; Nov. 10, 1959,
P.L 1467, § 1; Dec. 22, 1965, P.L. 1192, § 1; Dec. 22, 1965, P.L. 1193, § 1; PuwoDN's PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 2080.301 (Supp. 1970); Pinker, at 149, 117 A.2d at 784.
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obtained legal custody. The court's purpose is to determine only what
is for the "best interests" of the child as between parties with a prede-
termined right to care for that child. 46 In a dependent-neglect case it is
the State, in the form of Child Welfare Services or other agency, that
is the petitioning party. It is not only the interests of the child which the
juvenile court investigates, but also the neglect of the parents. The
power of the State to infringe on vital individual rights must always be
carefully limited. Even if the proceedings are to be classified with
custody cases, the protections afforded by the formalities of a civil trial
are lacking.
It is submitted that the better approach would be to classify depen-
dent-neglect proceedings as quasi-criminal, which would bring them
within the Gault and Winship decisions. There are three major argu-
ments for such classification.
First, the hearing is for the purpose of determining whether the
child will be removed from the parents' custody. Despite the fact that
it is the child's welfare that is of paramount concern, the conduct being
scrutinized is that of the parents in relation to their children-have the
parents "neglected" their children? The court looks to whether the
parents have or have not properly cared for their offspring. Their re-
moval from the home is a condemnation and punishment for the
parents.
Second, section 4727 of the Penal Code of Pennsylvania47 makes it a
misdemeanor to "abandon a child in destitute circumstances or to wil-
fully omit to furnish necessary and proper food, clothing or shelter for
such child." Although juvenile courts cannot prosecute or punish under
the Penal Code,48 they investigate the same behavior covered by section
4727, and mete out their own sentence-separation of parent from
child for an indeterminate period without the safeguards of procedural
due process.
Third, although the determination of the court is for the "welfare
and best interest of the child, '49 the result is a loss of the child's liberty
without procedural due process. The child is removed from his home
and family and is placed in a shelter, an institution, or a foster home
46. Com. ex rel. Gifford v. Miller, 213 Pa. Super. 269, 248 A.2d 63 (1968); Com. ex rel.
McNamee v. Jackson, 183 Pa. Super. 522, 132 A.2d 396 (1957); In re Rinker, supra note 38.
47. Act of June 24, 1939, P.L. 872, § 727, PURDON'S PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4727
(Supp. 1970).
48. Under PA. CONsT. art. V, §§ 1 and 5, added in 1968, criminal jurisdiction is
currently placed in the newly created Common Pleas courts. The criminal jurisdiction
of the new courts of Common Pleas replaces that of the old courts of Oyer and Terminer
and Quarter Sessions.
49. See note 10, § 250.
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involuntarily. It is a loss of the child's liberty in the sense that he loses
his natural right to be with his parents and family and is often shifted
from place to place without his consent. Although delinquency com-
mitments were always justified by the State as in the "best interest" of
the child, the Supreme Court found in Gault that a commitment
amounts to a loss of liberty and, therefore, requires procedural due
process.50 The same reasoning should apply where a child faces the
possibility of removal from his home.
THE RIGHTS INVOLVED
The Fourteenth Amendment forbids the State to deprive any person
of life or liberty without due process of law.51 Although no specifically
enumerated provision of the Constitution makes reference to the rights
of parent and child, the United States Supreme Court has recognized
the sanctity of marriage and the family as falling within the ambit
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
In Meyer v. Nebraska, the Court discussing the definition of liberty
as used in the Fourteenth Amendment, stated that it "denotes, not
merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right.., to marry,
establish a home and bring up children .... ,2
In its opinion in Loving v. Virginia53 the Court declared that the
freedom to marry is one of the essential rights of man and cannot be in-
fringed without due process of law. The rights to procreate and care
for the children of a marriage were recognized as vital and intimate
parts of the right to marry.
At great length and with several concurring opinions, the Court in
Griswold v. Connecticut54 reiterated the belief that the marriage
relationship and the concomitant right to bear and raise children, is
a constitutional right. All the safeguards of due process must apply
when the State attempts any infringment of this right. 5
From these three Supreme Court decisions, it may be argued that any
50. Gault, at 27.
51. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
52. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 399 (1923). In Meyer the Court held invalid a statute
restraining the teaching of foreign languages to children upon the ground, among others,
that it interfered with the right of parents to control the education of their children.
53. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), where the Court held invalid the Virginia
antimescegenation law.
54. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1964), where the Connecticut statute prohibit-
ing the procurement and use of contraceptives by married couples was held unconstitu-
tional.
55. Id. at 485.
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action by the State interfering with the family relationship is an inter-
ference with Fourteenth Amendment rights and requires the protec-
tions of procedural due process.
The Pennsylvania Courts have also recognized the natural and funda-
mental right of parents to the custody of their children. One of the
two major dependent-neglect decisions in Pennsylvania,50 In re Rinker,
declared that to remove children from their parents is a serious matter,
a power "to be exercised only with extreme care and where the evidence
clearly establishes necessity." 57 The belief that the right of a parent
to a child and a child to a parent is repeated in most of the significant
Pennsylvania custody cases. 58
The right of parents to the custody of their children and of children
to the care and guidance of their natural parents is one of long stand-
ing. To invade these rights is a serious undertaking and one which
deserves the full panoply of constitutional protections.
CONCLUSION
The ruling in Gault should be applied to dependent-neglect as well
as delinquency proceedings. It is not only the freedom of the child that
is at stake, but the entire family relationship. The family is the basis of
our society; an institution so fundamental that until recent years it
needed no defense or justification. To deny full constitutional protec-
tions when an infringement of this institution is contemplated, while
extending such protection to those accused of crime, is ludicrous. In
any dependent-neglect proceeding, the right to confrontation and cross-
examination of witnesses, and the right to counsel for the child, peti-
tioner, and parent are essential. The application of rules of evidence
and written rules of procedure are necessary to guarantee a fair and
competent hearing, which is implicit in the concept of due process.
Neither trial by jury, nor an adversary proceeding is being advocated.
To prevent abuse of discretion, to give all parties a fair hearing, and
56. See note 38.
57. Rinker, at 147, 117 A2d at 783.
58. Com. ex tel. Gifford v. Miller, 213 Pa. Super. 269, 248 A.2d 63 (1968); In re Neff
(Cochran Appeal), 187 Pa. Super. 79, 142 A.2d 499, case appealed, 394 Pa. 162, 145 A.2d
857 (1958); In re Duckworth, 188 Pa. Super. 232, 146 A.2d 365 (1958); Com. ex tel.
McNamee v. Jackson, 183 Pa. Super. 522, 132 A.2d 396 (1957); Com. ex rel. Harry v.
Eastridge, 374 Pa. 172, 92 A.2d 350 (1953); Com. ex rel. Keenan v. Thomas, 151 Pa. Super.
131, 30 A.2d 246 (1943); Com. ex tel. Cummings v. Nearhof, 141 Pa. Super. 581, 15 A.2d
529 (1940).
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to protect the constitutional rights involved, however, a confrontation
between advocates trained in the law and aware of the legal rights at
stake must be afforded. The spirit of the Constitution so demands.
DIANNE M. FABER
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